From housing economist Tom Lawler:
Early Read on Existing Home Sales in September
Based on publicly-available local realtor/MLS reports released across the country through today, I project that existing home sales as estimated by the National Association of Realtors ran at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 3.83 million in September, down 0.8% from August’s preliminary pace and down 3.8% from last September’s seasonally adjusted pace.
Local realtor/MLS reports suggest that the median existing single-family home sales price last month was up by about 3.9% from a year earlier.
CR Note on September sales: The National Association of Realtors (NAR) is scheduled to release September Existing Home Sales on Wednesday, October 23rd at 10 AM ET. The consensus is for 3.89 million SAAR, up from 3.86 million in August. The cycle low was 3.85 million SAAR in October 2023.
Update on the “Neutral” Rate
Executive Summary: Estimates of the “neutral” real interest rate are all over the map. Based on an assessment of various measures, my best is that the neutral real interest rate in the US is between 1 ¾% to 2%. One of course needs to add inflation/inflation expectations to that range. If/when the Fed were to achieve its 2% inflation target, then the neutral nominal interest rate would be 3 ¾% to 4%.
Last month the FOMC voted to lower its target range for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 4 ¾ percent to 5 percent. Here is an excerpt from Fed Chairman’s opening remarks at the post-meeting press conference.
“As inflation has declined and the labor market has cooled, the upside risks to inflation have diminished, and the downside risks to employment have increased. We now see the risks to achieving our employment and inflation goals as roughly in balance, and we are attentive to the risks to both sides of our dual mandate. In light of the progress on inflation and the balance of risks, at today’s meeting, the Committee decided to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by ½ percentage point to 4¾ percent to 5 percent. This recalibration of our policy stance will help maintain the strength of the economy and the labor market and will continue to enable further progress on inflation as we begin the process of moving toward a more neutral stance. We are not on any preset course. We will continue to make our decisions meeting by meeting. We know that reducing policy restraint too quickly could hinder progress on inflation. At the same time, reducing restraint too slowly could unduly weaken economic activity and employment. In considering additional adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.”
Since that meeting, of course, incoming data have included (1) a much higher than anticipated increase in September nonfarm payroll employment; (2) a much larger than expected decline in the September unemployment rate; (3) a slightly higher than expected increase in the core CPI index; and (4) a stronger than expected increase in September retail sales. All told, all of the incoming data suggest that third quarter real GDP growth rose at an annualized rate of slightly above 3%, well above the apparent expectation of most FOMC participants.
While these stronger than expected economic data has probably not dissuaded most FOMC members to expect additional declines in the federal funds rate over the next year, it probably has affected many members’ expectation on the pace of such declines over the next few quarters.
But regardless of what happens over the next month or two, it remains extremely unclear what level of the federal funds rate relative to the inflation rate would constitute a “neutral” monetary stance. That is, what is the so-called real (or inflation-adjusted) “neutral” interest rate, or the real short-term interest rate at which monetary policy is neither expansionary nor contractionary.
Unfortunately, this neutral rate is not directly observable, nor is it easily derivable, and not surprisingly there are substantial differences among policymakers, economists, and market participants on where the neutral rate really is.
Some folks look to the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections to gauge where FOMC participants believe where the “neutral” rate is, focusing on meeting participants’ projections of the “long-run” level of the federal funds rate. (Though, as I’ve recently shown, the track record of FOMC participants’ projections of future funds rates is abysmal.)
Before going on, it should be noted that the “neutral” rate is generally defined in “real,” or inflation-adjusted terms. In terms of the FOMC market participants’ projections all participants project that the long-run inflation rate will be 2%. In the table below I’ve converted the FOMC market participants’ funds rate projections to projections of the “real” federal funds rate, and show projections from September 2024, December 2023, December 2022, and December 2021.
As the table shows, the average of FOMC participants’ projections of the long-run real federal funds rate has increased gradually over the past three years, though surprisingly slightly over half of FOMC participants were still projecting a long-run real fed funds rate of under one percent. Some of these participants apparently are looking to the decade prior to the pandemic as a guide, though for several reasons that period is not really relevant to today’s economy and financial markets.
Other folks prefer to look at market-based estimates of the neutral real interest rate, with many looking to the Treasury Inflation Protection (TIPS) market, and especially forward TIPS yields implied by the TIPS yield curve. Below is a chart showing the 5-year forward TIPS yield 5 years out, derived from the 10-year TIPS yield and the 5-year TIPS yield (the chart shows quarterly averages.)
As the chart shows, the 5 year forward TIPS yield 5 years out has over the last year been only slightly lower than the average from 2005 to 2010, and is well above the levels seen in the 3 years prior to the pandemic. While forward rates may include a “term premium” (which is not directly observable), most estimates of term premiums are very small. As such, market-based measures such as TIPS yields suggest that the neutral real interest rate today may be almost a full percentage point higher than was the case in the two years prior to the pandemic.
For some commentary on yield curves and neutral interest rates, and why the neutral rate has gone up, see “Will Interest Rates Remain Elevated Even As Monetary Policy Normalizes?” (Schwartzman, Richmond Fed) and “Has the Economy Transitioned to a Higher Long-run Real Interest Rate Regime?” (Klieson, St. Louis Fed).
Finally, some folks look to econometric models to try to estimate the neutral interest rate. Unfortunately, such estimates vary massively based on the models, assumptions, and econometric techniques used.
One of the most widely followed but also one of the most problematic model-based estimates of the neutral interest rate is the one published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York based on the Holston-Laubach-Williams (HLW). This model uses a fairly simplistic neo-Keynesian growth model and attempts to “solve” for the natural rate. I call it problematic for two related reasons: first, a paper published by economist Daniel Buncic suggests that the HLW model is misspecified, and that a particular technique used in the model is inappropriate and leads to a significant downward bias in the HLW’s estimate of the contribution of “other factors” to its neutral rate estimate. (Buncic has other issues with the model. See “Econometric issues in the estimation of the natural rate of interest”.
Second, and on a related note, the latest HLW estimate of the natural rate of interest showed a decline from 1.19% in the fourth quarter of 2022 to 0.77% in the second quarter of 2024 despite higher “trend” economic growth, as the negative contribution of “other factors” to the natural rate increased by a whopping 60 basis points over this period. These “other factors” are not explicitly identified in the model, but are purportedly due to such things as demographics, fiscal policy, productivity growth, and other unidentified factors. Such a decline over such a short period makes little sense to me, and is suggestive of some of the “model” issues Bucic alludes to.
Another model that many follow is the Lubik-Matthes (LM), published on the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s website. Their approach does not include any structural economic model, but instead looks at the time-series behavior of a few key variables to “solve” for the neutral interest rates. In the second quarter of 2024 the LM estimates of the neutral rate was 2.60%, up from 2.38% in the fourth quarter of 2022 and 1.25% in the fourth quarter of 2019.
Here is a graph showing historical data for the HLW model, the LM model, and the tips 5-year forward rate 5-years out.
As this chart shows, the two widely-followed “model-based” estimates of the real neutral interest rate are massively different and showing different trends over the last few years, while the TIPS –based estimate shows a significant increase from just before the pandemic.
While it is difficult to know what to make from these various measures, there is one other thing to consider: the fact that the economy has done extremely well over the last few quarters, suggesting that monetary policy over the last year has not been nearly as restrictive as stated by those who believed the neutral real interest rate was low.
Having said all of that, one can make a very plausible case that the neutral real interest rate is much closer to levels seen prior to the financial crisis than to levels seen during the period from the financial crisis to just before the pandemic. Some folks seem to forget that the financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn were not just the worst since the Great Recession, but that the financial crisis was really, really scary. Both US and European policymakers were worried that the financial system could collapse, and worries about the financial system’s stability and the fragility of the economy persisted for years following the official end of the recession. This was evident in the size and length of government support for the economy and the financial system for an extended period of time. (And don’t forget the multiple European sovereign debt crises!) The financial crisis also radically changed how policymakers, investors, and companies viewed and measured risk for a relatively long period of time, dampening investment and restraining growth. In such an environment it’s not surprising that the neutral real interest rate would be low. However, the current period isn’t anything like that earlier And, of course, the pandemic meant that the period from 2020 to mid-2022 was not a good period to compare to the current period. As such, in looking at history as it relates to the current period it’s probably best to place very little if any weight to what happened from 2008 to mid-2022.
So net, in my opinion it would appear as if the neutral real interest rate is probably somewhere in the 1 ¾ to2% range. If the inflation rate were at, say, 2 ½ then the neutral nominal interest rate would be 4 ¼ to 4 ½ %, while in the inflation rate were 2%, the neutral nominal interest rate would be 3 ¾ to 4%.
This was from housing economist Tom Lawler.
New York Fed's DSGE model agrees.
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/dsge#/interactive